Faced with a successful counter-offensive by Ukraine in the country’s east and south in recent weeks, as well as a growing chorus of hawks in Russian state media criticizing Russia’s military failures, Russian President Vladimir Putin raised the stakes Is. It has ordered the mobilization of 300,000 additional troops and implied that it would use nuclear weapons if the West continued to support Ukraine. After a sham referendum in four Russian-occupied territories, Putin signed a decree on Friday to annex them to Russia. Now, Ukraine’s retaliation will be considered an attack on Russia itself and a retaliation will be made. These actions underscore the miscalculations behind Putin’s decision to strike in February and his determination to oust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from power. Seven months after the start of the invasion, Putin has learned no lessons from the mistakes that doomed it in the first place.
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, it was clear that Putin had made four major miscalculations. The first erroneous estimate was to underestimate the strength and effectiveness of the Russian army. Of course, only those close to him would tell him what he wanted to hear. Putin was apparently convinced that after a 72-hour blitzkrieg the war would be over, Kyiv would fall, and Zelensky would surrender or flee and be replaced by a puppet government controlled by Russia.
Russian officers were reported to be carrying the ceremonial uniform to be worn during the expected victory parade. But the Russian military fared far worse than Putin (and apparently US intelligence agencies). It was unable to take Kyiv and had to make a humiliating retreat, leaving devastation in its wake, with atrocities committed in Buka, a suburb of Kyiv, and other surrounding areas. Many young Russian recruits were so badly prepared for conflict that they didn’t even know they were invading Ukraine, and Russian morale was low. Tanks and other military equipment were in need of repair, logistics were disorganized, and the invading army did not bring enough fuel or food to sustain it for a long war. Corruption that pervaded all aspects of Russian society was rampant in the military as well. The money that should have gone to training and equipment instead went loose in people’s pockets.
Faced with a successful counter-offensive by Ukraine in the country’s east and south in recent weeks, as well as a growing chorus of hawks in Russian state media criticizing Russia’s military failures, Russian President Vladimir Putin raised the stakes Is. It has ordered the mobilization of 300,000 additional troops and implied that it would use nuclear weapons if the West continued to support Ukraine. After a sham referendum in four Russian-occupied territories, Putin signed a decree on Friday to annex them to Russia. Now, Ukraine’s retaliation will be considered an attack on Russia itself and a retaliation will be made. These actions underscore the miscalculations behind Putin’s decision to strike in February and his determination to oust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from power. Seven months after the start of the invasion, Putin has learned no lessons from the mistakes that doomed it in the first place.
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, it was clear that Putin had made four major miscalculations. The first erroneous estimate was to underestimate the strength and effectiveness of the Russian army. Of course, only those close to him would tell him what he wanted to hear. Putin was apparently convinced that after a 72-hour blitzkrieg the war would be over, Kyiv would fall, and Zelensky would surrender or flee and be replaced by a puppet government controlled by Russia.
This article is adapted from the newly updated e-book version Putin’s world: Russia against the West and with the rest by Angela Stant (twelve, 448 pp., $12.99, originally published in February 2019, updated September 2022).
Russian officers were reported to be carrying the ceremonial uniform to be worn during the expected victory parade. But the Russian military fared far worse than Putin (and apparently US intelligence agencies). It was unable to take Kyiv and had to make a humiliating retreat, leaving devastation in its wake, with atrocities committed in Buka, a suburb of Kyiv, and other surrounding areas. Many young Russian recruits were so badly prepared for conflict that they didn’t even know they were invading Ukraine, and Russian morale was low. Tanks and other military equipment were in need of repair, logistics were disorganized, and the invading army did not bring enough fuel or food to sustain it for a long war. Corruption that pervaded all aspects of Russian society was rampant in the military as well. The money that should have gone to training and equipment instead went loose in people’s pockets.
The second major miscalculation was the underestimation of the Ukrainian people and army. Apparently Putin was misinformed about the Ukrainian national identity and willingness to fight. If he expected that Ukrainians would greet their Russian “liberators” with flowers, they made a grave mistake. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbass in 2014 fostered a Ukrainian national identity that Putin failed to understand. Once the offensive was underway, the United States offered to evacuate Zelensky from Kyiv, but he replied, “I don’t need a ride, I need more ammunition.” The Russians seem to have found no one to form a pro-Russian government, and the FSB unit in charge of finding allies in Ukraine was later severely disciplined with rumors of high-level arrests.
Comedian-turned-president Zelensky, whose approval rating was around 30 percent before the war, rose to the occasion and surprised the world by providing charismatic and inspiring leadership, leading some to compare him to Britain’s wartime prime minister, Winston Churchill. Of. Zelensky proved extremely effective in using social media to communicate with his population and the outside world at night. Although the Ukrainian army had fewer troops than Russia and less sophisticated military hardware, its morale was high. It was fighting for a reason: national survival. It was supported by the West, particularly the United States, whose weapons and intelligence enabled Ukraine to push back the Russians and the Europeans. Moscow’s unprovoked aggression united Ukrainians like never before—and this includes Russian-speaking Ukrainians, especially as Russian brutality escalated.
Putin’s third miscalculation was that the West was divided and would not lead to a common cause against Russia. When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and recognized the independence of Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the West barely reacted. During the Trump administration, US-European relations had reached a new low. Europe was divided over how to deal with Russia, with Western Europe more willing to engage than the more skeptical Central European and Baltic countries. Everything changed on 24 February. The specter of a major war of aggression in Europe 77 years after the end of World War II caused most Europeans to reconsider their relationship with Russia and conclude that they had misread Putin. The Biden administration worked hard to unite its European and Indo-Pacific allies to support Ukraine and punish Russia. Allied unity after the invasion has been impressive.
In fact, Putin’s fourth miscalculation was his belief that Europeans were so invested in their economic ties with Russia – particularly their energy dependence – that they would be unwilling to impose sanctions. In 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and the start of the Donbass War, the United States and Europe imposed financial sanctions that Russia easily endured. Its restrictions on European food imports also stimulated the development of Russia’s agricultural sector.
Putin’s goal from the very beginning has been to restore Russia as a great power – a member of the global board of directors, so to speak. The defeat and subjugation of Ukraine was essential to its ability to re-establish Russian dominance in its neighborhood and to project power into the West. If Russia conquers Ukraine, it will re-create a Slavic union with a large part of Imperial Russia—Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly northern Kazakhstan—and then be in a position to redefine Europe’s security architecture. .
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s obsession with historical Russian claims and grievances raise a far-reaching question: is Russia an exception to the rule that all empires eventually disintegrate, imperial power rises and post-imperialism’s role? accepts? After all, this is what the Ottomans, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain and France did in the 20th century. Celebrating Russia’s exceptionalism, Putin and his followers insisted that rusky miroThe greater Russian world – was eternal and must be restored. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the new Russia ushered in three changes: from a communist to a post-communist state, from a state-controlled to a market economy, and from an imperial to an imperial one. Later all three transitions stopped and went in reverse. Russia was no longer a communist state, but it was an authoritarian state, as was the Soviet Union. Today, the state has recaptured much of the private sector. And under Putin, Russia has no intention of being after imperialism.
Seven months into the war, Putin’s imperial project is setting in. Ukrainian national identity is stronger than ever, and Ukrainians are united against Russia like they have never been. The West has been united for over a decade; Finland and Sweden, which firmly maintained their neutral position during the Cold War, have applied to join NATO; And Ukraine is now a candidate for membership in the European Union. In addition, the United States announced that it would permanently deploy troops to Poland at the Madrid NATO summit in June. Russia’s economy is globalizing and cutting off from the rest of the world. A new diaspora of perhaps half a million Russians has fled to the West or to other post-Soviet states, taking their energy and intellectual capital with them and hoping to return after Putin is no longer in power.
In addition to being a master strategist, Putin has achieved the exact opposite of what he had set out to achieve with his invasion of Ukraine. Wrongful mobilization, renewed nuclear threats against the West, and the apparent sabotage of the two Nord Stream pipelines have only strengthened Western unity. Doubts about Russia’s capabilities are now rising in parts of the global south, which has so far remained neutral in the conflict. It is difficult to see how Putin will be able to reverse Russia’s fortunes in this senseless war – but so far, it seems he has no intention of ending it.